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Abstract
This paper develops a simple theoretical model to analyze Marx’s
theory of ground rent. Using the model, I demonstrate two important
results. First, if we take capital as exogenous, then total ground-rent
can be decomposed into the three components: differential rent of the
first variety (DRI), differential rent of the second variety (DRII), and
absolute rent (AR). Second, if we endogenize capital outlays using
profit-maximizing behaviour of capitalist farmers, then absolute rent
becomes zero. Thus, under reasonable behavioural assumptions about
landlords and capitalist farmers, there will be no absolute rent in a
capitalist economy.
JEL Codes: B51.
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1 Introduction
The theory of ground-rent is an important but severely under-theorized part
of Marxist political economy. Part of the reason for the lack of theoreti-
cal development in this area probably arises from the difficulty scholars face
in clearly and precisely defining the meaning of key terms involved in the
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discussion: ground rent, and the three components into which Marx decom-
posed it, i.e. differential rent of the first variety (DRI), differential rent of
the second variety (DRII) and absolute rent (AR). In this paper, I present
a theoretical model to define ground-rent, to decompose it into DRI, DRII
and AR, and to analyze in detail the meaning and source of AR.
Marx understood ground-rent, in a capitalist economy, as a part of the
surplus value that is appropriated by private owners of non-reproducible re-
sources like land (Marx, 1993). Use of the non-reproducible resource can
confer benefits on capitalist producers and generate what Marx called ‘sur-
plus profit’, i.e. profit over and above the prevailing uniform (average) rate
of profit. Therefore, bargaining between private owners of non-reproducible
resources and capitalist producers who wish to use those resources leads to
the latter appropriating the full amount of the surplus profit as ground-rent.
Therefore, for Marx, ground-rent is the economic form that the monopoly
of private ownership of non-reproducible resources takes in a capitalist econ-
omy, and its magnitude is the surplus profit. While Marx mainly discussed
land and agricultural production, he was clear that his analysis applied to all
non-reproducible resources in capitalist economies where a private monopoly
of ownership obtains.
Whenever natural forces can be monopolized and give the indus-
trialist who make use of them a surplus profit, whether a waterfall,
a rich mine, fishing grounds or a well situated building site, the
person indicated as the owner of these natural objects, by virtue
of his title to a portion of the earth, seizes this surplus profit
from the functioning capital in the form of rent. (Marx, 1993,
Chapter 46, pp. 908)
Using numerical examples, Marx had argued that the total ground-rent
on any plot of land can be decomposed into three parts: DRI, which captures
relative quality advantages of the plot; DRII, which captures the effect of
the quantity of capital employed, and therefore diminishing marginal returns
to the application of capital, on any plot of land; and AR, which, according to
Marx, captures the effect of low organic composition of capital in agriculture
or the class power of landlords. Using the model presented in this paper,
we will be able to decompose total ground-rent along the lines proposed by
Marx. The decomposition analysis demonstrates the following interesting
results: if we take the capital outlays as exogenously given, then ground-
rent can indeed be decomposed into three positive components, DRI,DRII
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and AR; but, if we endogenize the magnitude of capital outlay using profit-
maximizing behaviour of capitalist farmers, then absolute rent will be zero.
Perhaps previous discussions of Marx’s rent theory have been mired in
controversy and disagreements because scholars have not precisely defined
the meaning of basic terms or moved beyond the use of simple numerical
examples (Mandel, 1962; Ball, 1977; Fine, 1979; Haila, 1990; Ramirez, 2009;
Fine and Filho, 2010; Ward and Aalbers, 2016). While there is broad agree-
ment about the definition of ground-rent, there is much controversy about
the decomposition of ground-rent into its three components: DRI, DRII
and AR. Two sources of disagreements are especially worth highlighting.
First, scholars have very different views about the existence, meaning and
source of absolute rent (Fine, 1979; Ramirez, 2009; Fine and Filho, 2010).
While some scholars view absolute rent as arising from the class power (or
monopoly power) of landlords (Ramirez, 2009), others contend that the cause
of absolute rent is the relatively low organic composition of capital in agri-
culture (Fine, 1979, 2019). Second, while there is agreement on the meaning
of DRI and DRII, there is no theoretical framework available to imple-
ment the intuitions about these two components of differential rent. Part
of the difficulty in carrying out this decomposition arises because DRI and
DRII use different references. While DRI is defined with respect to the
worst-quality plot of land, DRII is defined with respect to the worst-unit of
capital. Most scholars, following Marx, have addressed DRI and DRII one
at a time, but have not been able to integrate them together into a single
theoretical framework (Fine, 1979; Fine and Filho, 2010).
The first contribution of this paper is to offer a general theoretical frame-
work in which key insights of Marx regarding ground-rent and its decom-
position into DRI, DRII and AR can be analyzed. In particular, I show
that the total ground-rent on any plot of land can be decomposed into DRI,
DRII and AR. Thus, I present an integrated framework to decompose total
ground-rent into its three components.
The second contribution of this paper is to throw some light on the mean-
ing and existence of absolute rent. My analysis shows that absolute rent can
be positive only when there is a gap between the marginal product of capital
outlay and the opportunity cost of employing capital. If capitalist producers
choose to maximize profits, then their choice of capital outlay will equate
the marginal product of capital outlay and the opportunity cost of employ-
ing capital. Hence, in general, absolute rent will be zero. Positive AR will
arise only when some gap can be opened up between the marginal product
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of capital outlay and the opportunity cost of employing capital. The anal-
ysis in this paper shows that neither a lower organic composition of capital
in agriculture compared to the rest of the economy nor the class power of
landlords can generate such a gap. My analysis therefore suggests that, un-
der reasonable behavioural assumptions, there will be no absolute rent in a
capitalist economy.
In developing the analysis presented in this paper, I build on and extend
two recent attempts to clarify Marx’s theory of ground-rent, including its
decomposition, using simple mathematical models: Basu (2018) and Das
(2018). While Basu (2018) developed a simple mathematical framework to
think about ground-rent and its decomposition, it had serious conceptual
problems. The main problems were that it identified absolute rent with the
worst-quality plot without any reference to magnitudes of capital outlay,
which is conceptually problematic, and it could not distinguish consistently
between the two components of differential rent. Das (2018) made a real
advance and offered a way to deal with both problems in Basu (2018). The
main theoretical drawbacks of the analysis in Das (2018) were, first, the
use of discrete changes of capital outlay, which follows Marx’s analysis but
is difficult to justify, and second, taking the amount of capital outlay as
exogenously given. In this paper, I extend the analysis in Das (2018) in three
ways. First, I do away with the need to conceptualize changes in capital
outlay in discrete units; second, I endogenise capital outlays across plots
of land using profit-maximising behavior of capitalist farmers; and third, I
explicitly model the determination of the price of the agricultural commodity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the
set-up for the analysis and define the technological conditions of production.
In section 3, I define ground-rent and derive explicit expressions for its three
components when capital outlays are exogenously given: DRI,DRII,AR.
In section 4, I endogenize capital outlays using profit maximising behaviour
of capitalists and show that, in such a situation, absolute rent will be zero. In
section 5, I close the model by determining the price of corn by the interaction
of demand and supply of the agricultural product. The final section concludes
the discussion.
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2 Conditions of Production
2.1 The Set-Up
We conceive of the economy as being composed of an industrial sector and
an agricultural sector. Industry is composed of I sectors, each producing
a single product with a given technique of production. The agricultural
sector produces a homogenous output, called corn, using land, labour, and
inputs from industry. We work with the implicit assumption that corn is
a non-basic product, i.e., it is not used as a direct means of production in
any production process. In such a scenario, the prices of industrial products
form a decomposable system of equation - which determines the prices of
the industrial products and the average rate of profit (Kurz, 1978, pp. 27).
Hence, for the analysis of rent, in this paper, we take the prices of industrial
products, the wage rate and the average rate of profit, as given.
In agriculture, there are three classes: capitalists, workers and landlords.
Capitalist organize production of corn by leasing in land from landlords and
purchasing the labour-power of workers. The lease contract between capi-
talists and landlords specifies a fixed period of time - one production cycle
- for which the latter hands over the right to use the relevant plot of land
to the capitalist in return for a monetary payment known as ground-rent.
The labour contract between capitalists and workers specifies a fixed period
of time - one production cycle - for which the latter gives up the use of her
labour-power to the capitalist for a monetary payment known as the wage.
After production is completed, the capitalist sells the corn on the open mar-
ket to recoup the wage and rent payments she made earlier and, in addition,
make a profit income.
The presuppositions for the capitalist mode of production [in
agriculture] are thus as follows: the actual cultivators are wage-
labourers, employed by a capitalist, the farmer, who pursues agri-
culture simply as a particular field of exploitation of capital, as an
investment of his capital in a particular sphere of production. At
certain specified dates, e.g. annually, this capitalist-farmer pays
the landowner, the proprietor of the land he exploits, a contrac-
tually fixed sum of money ... for the permission to employ his
capital in this particular field of production. This sum of money
is known as ground-rent, irrespective of whether it is paid for
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agricultural land, building land, mines, fisheries, forests, etc. It
is paid for the entire period for which the landowner has contrac-
tually rented the land to the farmer. Marx (1993, pp. 755-756).
2.2 Technology of Production
Suppose the total available land used in agricultural production is divided
into N plots and is indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Let a subset of these plots, in-
dexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , n, be in use for agricultural production. An important
point worth highlighting upfront is that n is a function of the price of corn,
p, i.e. n = n(p). The reason for this is easy to explain. As the price of corn
changes, it has an impact on which plot is able to generate ‘surplus profit’
and hence provide ground-rent. Since plots of land will not be leased out by
landlords unless they receive positive amount of ground-rent, the number of
plots that will be used for agricultural cultivation will itself depend on the
price of the agricultural commodity. Thus, we should note that the plots of
land that are in use should be indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , n(p), where p is the
price of the agricultural commodity.
On the i-th plot of land that is in use, let total capital outlay by the
capitalist producer of corn be denoted by ki = ci + vi, where ci and vi are
constant and variable capital respectively. Here ci refers to the sum of money
used by the capitalist to purchase non-labour inputs into production, and vi
refers to the sum of money used to purchase labour-power (for one production
cycle).
Let fi(.) denote the ‘production function’ on the i-th plot of land, i.e.
fi(.) captures the relationship between total capital outlays and the quantity
of output on the i-th plot (which is why the function is indexed by i). We
assume that the collection of ‘production functions’ have standard concavity
properties.
Assumption 1. Output on each plot of land is zero if capital outlay is zero,
i.e. fi(0) = 0, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n(p). The quantity of output increases
with the magnitude of capital outlay, i.e. f ′i(k) > 0 for k ≥ 0; the marginal
increase in output is always nonnegative and finite, i.e. 0 ≤ f ′i(k) < ∞ for
k ≥ 0; and, the marginal increase in output diminishes with the magnitude
of capital outlay, i.e. f ′′i (k) < 0 for k ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 is inspired by Pasinetti (1977, Chapter 1, Section 3), and
its justification is straightforward. Land cannot be ‘produced’ by labour.
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Thus, the amount of land in each plot (or parcel) is fixed, i.e. land is a
non-reproducible resource. The above assumption says that as more capital
is invested on this fixed plot of land, the output increases but only at a
declining rate - as captured in Figure 1.1
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Figure 1: This figure depicts the production function on th i-th plot of land
that is in use for agricultural production. The curve fi(k) denotes the output,
and f ′i(k) denotes the marginal product, both as a function of the amount of
capital outlay, k.
2.3 Worst-Quality Plot
The plots of land are of unequal ‘quality’; some plots are more fertile, or
have better location, than others. But we cannot order plots of land by
1For a similar assumption see Figure 1.4 in Pasinetti (1977, Chapter 1, Section 3).
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productivity without taking account of the amount of capital outlay in each
plot, as has been stressed by Sraffian scholars (Kurz, 1978).2 Because the
area of each plot of land is fixed and the production function is concave by
assumption 1, different amounts of capital outlay across plots can give rise
to different ordering of land productivity (measured by the marginal product
of capital outlay). There can be ordering reversals when capital outlays
vary across plots. Hence, we cannot define the ‘quality’ of plots of land
independently of capital outlay. This is highlighted in Figure 2, where we
can see that the marginal product curves for the i-th and j-th plots cross over.
For low levels of capital outlay, the j-th plot has higher marginal product; at
higher levels of capital outlays, the position is reversed and the i-th plot has
a higher marginal product. Our analysis in this paper is general enough to
allow for such productivity reversals. But more importantly, we cannot order
plots of land according to quality without taking account of capital outlays.
In this paper, we will adopt the convention of ordering plots of land by the
marginal product of the very ‘first’ unit of capital outlay. The intuition for
this is that the marginal product of capital at the very start of capital outlay
on any plot of land comes closest to capturing the notion of the ‘intrinsic’
productivity of that plot of land. Considering a continuum of changes in
capital outlay, it gives us the amount of increase in output (of corn) when
capital outlay is increased from zero to a small positive amount. It is also
able to capture any productivity that derives from past capital outlays on
fixed capital, like irrigation, etc. that is now part of the plot of land.
Using this idea, we will order plots i and j according to intrinsic quality as
follows: we will say that plot i is of higher quality than plot j if f ′i(0) > f
′
j(0).
Since there are a finite number of plots, we can always arrange them in dimin-
ishing order of quality, as we have defined it here (with strict inequalities).
Once we do so, we can renumber the plots and call plot 1 the most fertile,
plot 2 the next most fertile, and so on. We state this as assumption about
the ordering of the intrinsic quality of plots of land as
Assumption 2. f ′1(0) > f
′
2(0) > · · · > f ′n−1(0) > f ′n(0), where n = n(p) and
p is the price of the agricultural commodity.
Our analysis of ground-rent will proceed in three steps. In the first step,
we will derive expressions for ground-rent and its three components, DRI,
2One of the errors in Ricardo’s analysis of rent was the assumption that plots of land
could be ordered according to fertility without taking account of capital investment. (Kurz,
1978).
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Figure 2: This figure depicts the marginal product of capital outlay on the i-th
and j-th plots of land. Note how there is a reversal of marginal productivity
ranking of the two plots when we move from low to high capital outlays.
DRII and AR, taking the capital outlays on each plot of land, ki, the price
of corn, p, and the economy-wide rate of profit, r, as given. In the second
step, we will endogenize the capital outlay, ki, by positing profit-maximising
behaviour of capitalist farmers. In the third, and final, step, we will close
the model by endogenizing the price of corn, p, by allowing the interaction
of demand and supply of corn to clear the market for corn.
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3 Ground-Rent With Exogenous Capital Out-
lays
Taking the capital outlays on each plot of land, ki, and the price of corn, p,
and the economy-wide rate of profit, r, as exogenously given, we would like to
determine the magnitude of ground-rent on each plot of land and decompose
it into DRI, DRII and AR.
3.1 Total Ground-Rent
Since the price of corn is given by p, and the economy-wide rate of profit is
denoted by r, we can define what Marx calls the ‘surplus profit’ on the i-th
plot of land as pfi(ki) − (1 + r)ki, where pfi(ki) is the revenue earned and
(1 + r)ki is the counterfactual revenue that would have been earned if the
total capital outlay, ki, had earned the economy-wide average rate of profit.
The key insight of Marx’ analysis of rent is that private ownership of land by
the class of landlords - which he refers to as the monopoly of landed property
- allows them to appropriate the surplus profit as ground-rent (Marx, 1993,
Chapter 37). Marx was not able to consistently implement this idea. In this
paper, we begin with the definition that ground-rent is the total surplus profit
appropriated by the class of landlords. Subsequently, we will decompose it
into its components.
Implementing the definition of ground-rent in our model, we see that its
magnitude on the i-th plot of land, measured in units of corn, is given by
GRi = fi(ki)−
(1 + r)ki
p
=
∫ ki
0
f ′i(k)dk −
(1 + r)ki
p
. (1)
Since fi(ki) is the total output on the i-th plot with capital outlay, ki, and
(1 + r)(ki/p) is revenue earned, in real terms, on the same capital employed
elsewhere in the economy (where the rate of profit is r), the surplus profit
is given by the difference between the two. Using the fact that fi(ki) =∫ ki
0
f ′i(k)dk, which follows from assumption 1, and especially that fi(0) = 0,
we then get the expression in (1).
We can use Figure 3 to build some intuition about ground-rent. In this
figure, we have plotted the marginal product of capital outlay, f ′i(k), on the
vertical axis against the amount of capital outlay, k, on the horizontal axis.
The total amount of capital outlay on this plot of land is given by ki. Hence,
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Figure 3: Ground rent in agriculture on the i-th plot of land measured in
units of corn. The horizontal axis measures total capital outlay; the vertical
axis measures the marginal output as a function of capital outlay, f ′i(k). The
price of corn is p and the economy-wide rate of profit is r. Total ground rent
on the i-th plot of land is given by the area DCAG.
total output of corn is given by the area DCHO, which is the first term in
(1). The area GAHO represents the amount of corn that would be needed
to ensure the economywide rate of profit, r, on the total capital outlay, ki.
This is the second term in (1). Hence, the total ground-rent on the i-th plot
of land is represented by the area DCAG.
In writing the expression for total ground-rent in (1) and in construct-
ing the corresponding visual representation in figure 3, we have implicitly
assumed that f ′i(ki) > (1 + r)/p for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. This assumption means
that on each plot of land that is in use, the marginal product of capital out-
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lay, f ′i(ki), is greater than the opportunity cost of investing capital elsewhere
in the economy, (1 + r)/p, where r is the uniform rate of profit and p is the
price of the agricultural commodity. This is a crucial assumption for the
analysis of absolute rent and we will come back to it several times in the rest
of the paper.
3.2 Marginal-Capital Plot
We would now like to decompose the magnitude of total rent given in (1)
into two components: differential rent and absolute rent. To do so, we need
to identify the ‘marginal’ unit of capital outlay, i.e. the unit of capital outlay
that is least productive, and then use this benchmark to define differential
rent. Note that each plot of land has diminishing marginal productivity of
capital outlay because f ′′i (.) < 0. Hence, to identify the marginal capital, we
just need to find the minimum of the marginal output on each plot of land
at their capital outlay levels. Recall that the amount of capital outlay on the
i-th plot of land is given by ki. Hence, we can define the output associated
with the marginal unit of capital as
ym ≡ ym (p) = min
i∈{1,2,...,n(p)}
f ′i(ki), (2)
where ym is the marginal output associated with the least productive unit of
capital outlay used among all plots of land. Note that ym is a function of p,
the price of the agricultural commodity, because it is the minimum of f ′i(ki)
where i ranges over {1, 2, . . . , n(p)}. Since n = n(p), ym is also a function of
p. To make this explicit, we have specified ym = ym (p).
Let us identify this plot of land with the index m, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n(p),
and call it the marginal-capital plot of land. Thus, the m-th plot of land has
the lowest marginal product of capital outlay for the last unit of capital, i.e.
ym = f ′m(km). Note that, in general, m 6= n(p), i.e. the worst plot of land in
terms of quality that has been identified in assumption 2 is not, in general,
the plot of land with the ‘marginal’ unit of capital outlay.
3.3 Differential and Absolute Rent
The first step of the decomposition of total rent is given as,
GRi = DRi + ARi, (3)
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where the first component in (3) is total differential rent,
DRi (p) =
∫ ki
0
[f ′i(k)− ym (p)] dk, (4)
and the second component in (3) is absolute rent,
ARi (p) = ki
[
ym (p)− (1 + r)
p
]
. (5)
An important point to keep in mind is that both DRi and ARi are functions
of p, the price of the agricultural commodity, and r, the economy-wide rate
of profit. This is easy to see from (3) and (5).
Figure 4 shows the decomposition of rent into differential and absolute
rent. Total ground rent, represented by area DCAG, is the sum of differential
rent, represented by the area DCBF , and absolute rent, represented by
the area FBAG. We call the first component, DRi, as differential rent
because its magnitude depends on productivity differences across plots of
land arising both from its ‘intrinsic’ productivity and from differences in
magnitudes of capital outlay. The second component, ARi, is known as
absolute rent because it does not depend on differences across plots of land.
Since there is large disagreement in the extant literature about absolute
rent, let us spend some time studying it. From the expression in (5), we see
that absolute rent on the i-th plot, ARi, arises from the gap between the
minimum marginal product, ym, and the opportunity cost of capital outlay,
(1 + r)/p. As long as this gap exists, there will be positive absolute rent; if
this gap is wiped out, there will be no absolute rent. This is precisely where
the implicit assumption that f ′i(ki) > (1 + r)/p becomes important. Since
f ′i(ki) > (1+ r)/p for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, this implies that the minimum of f
′
i(ki),
i.e. ym, is also larger than (1 + r)/p. Hence, ym > (1 + r)/p. This ensures
that there is positive absolute rent on the i-th plot of land.
Marx had conceived of absolute rent as the total rent earned on a new
plot of land that is brought under cultivation to satisfy rising demand for
corn (Marx, 1993, Chapter 45). Implicit in Marx’s analysis is the idea that
the new land brought under cultivation is also the least fertile plot of land,
a fact that has been emphasized by Fine (1979). In Marx’s analysis, the
source of absolute rent is the relatively lower organic composition of capital
in agriculture compared to the rest of the economy. Fine (1979, pp. 263) has
an algebraic expression to capture this idea. Following Marx’s claim, Fine
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Figure 4: Ground rent in agriculture on the i-th plot of land measured in
units of corn. The horizontal axis measures total capital outlay; the vertical
axis measures the marginal output as a function of capital outlay, f ′i(k). The
price of corn is p and the economy-wide rate of profit is r. Total ground
rent on the i-th plot of land is given by the area DCAG, differential rent by
DCBF and absolute rent by FBAG.
(1979) shows that if the organic composition of capital rises in the rest of the
economy even as the organic composition of capital in agriculture remains
unchanged, there should be an increase in absolute rent, as Marx (1993)
claims. In our model, this effect is easy to capture. The relative rise in the
organic composition of capital in the rest of the economy ceteris paribus leads
to a fall in the uniform rate of profit, r. From the expression in (5), we can
see that this will lead to a rise in absolute rent if ym and p does not change.
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3.4 Differential Rent I and II
The second step of the decomposition is to break up total differential rent
in (4) into DRI and DRII. To do so, we will use the least productive plot,
indexed by n according to assumption 2, as the benchmark to define DRIi.
To implement this decomposition let us define a level of capital outlay on the
i-th plot of land, k∗i , such that the marginal product of capital outlay on the
i-th plot of land at this level of capital outlay is exactly equal to f ′n(p)(0), i.e.
f ′i(k
∗
i ) = f
′
n(p)(0). (6)
Assumption 1 and 2 guarantees that a positive value of k∗i (p) always exists
(as long as all plots have positive capital outlays), which is a function of p,
the price of the agricultural commodity, because n is a function of p, i.e.
n = n(p). With this definition of k∗i (p), we can define differential rent of the
first variety as,
DRIi (p) =
∫ k∗i (p)
0
f ′i(k)dk − k∗i (p) f ′n(p)(0)
=
∫ k∗i (p)
0
[
f ′i(k)− f ′n(p)(0)
]
dk. (7)
Note that assumption 2 ensures that DRIi (p) is positive. If we weaken as-
sumption 2 and use weak inequalities, then we will be ensured a nonnegative
DRIi (p). Thus, we will always have DRIi (p) ≥ 0.
What is the intuition for the definition of DRIi (p)? Using the worst-
quality plot of land as the benchmark, we are identifying all units of capital
outlay that have higher marginal product, i.e. productivity, than the ‘in-
trinsic’ quality of the worst-quality plot. When we add up all the additional
output produced by these units of capital, we get DRIi (p), as defined in (7).
Thus, this definition captures Marx’s intuition that differential rent of the
first variety arises due to differences in the quality (or fertility) of plots of land
- the extensive margin of David Ricardo. Using Figure 5, this method would
translate into identifying differential rent of first variety, DRIi (p), as the
area DIJ . This area depends of p, the price of the agricultural commodity,
because k∗i = k
∗
i (p).
We can now define the second component of differential rent as the dif-
ference of total differential rent and differential rent of the first variety, i.e.
DRIIi (p) =
∫ ki
0
[f ′i(k)− ym (p)] dk −DRIi (p) . (8)
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Using Figure 5, differential rent of second variety would be identified with the
area IJCBF , which is the difference in total differential rent, DCBF , and
differential rent of the first variety, DIJ . Since ym (p) ≤ f ′i(ki) < f ′n(p)(0),
where the last (strict) inequality is true if ki > 0 for all plots, we can see that
the area IJBF will always be nonnegative. Hence, DRIIi (p) ≥ 0.
What is the intuition for DRIIi (p)? We have seen earlier that total differ-
ential rent DRi (p), defined in (4), arises from a combination of productivity
differences that come from differences in quality of plots of land and differ-
ences in the magnitude of capital outlay. We have also seen that DRIi (p),
defined in (7), arises from differences in quality of a plot with respect to
the benchmark worst-quality plot of land. When we remove DRIi (p) from
DRi (p), we are left with the component of differential rent that arises due
to differences in magnitude of capital outlay. Hence, DRIIi (p), as defined
in (8), captures Marx’s intuition that differential rent of the second vari-
ety arises from differences in the magnitude of capital outlay - the intensive
margin of David Ricardo.
We can now bring together the above discussion to see that Marx’s ideas
about ground-rent, including his claim about its decomposition into three
parts, can be rigorously established. Defining total ground-rent as the trans-
formation of surplus profit, we have shown that it can be decomposed on any
plot of land into differential rent of first variety, differential rent of second
variety, and absolute rent, i.e.
GRi (p) = DRIi (p) +DRIIi (p) + ARi (p) ,
where GRi (p) is defined in (1), DRIi (p) is defined in (7), DRIIi (p) is defined
in (8), and ARi (p) is defined in (5). It is important to note that not only
the total ground-rent, but each component of ground-rent as well depends
on the price of the agricultural commodity, p.
3.5 Two Special Plots of Land
The analysis of rent presented above uses two special plots of land as refer-
ence plots, the m-th plot (the worst capital plot), and the n-th plot of land
(the worst quality plot of land, according to the convention captured in As-
sumption 2). What can we say about the components of rent on these two
reference plots of land?
On the worst capital plot, ym = f ′m(km), i.e. y
m is the marginal product
on the worst capital plot. The decomposition of total rent on the worst capital
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Figure 5: Ground rent in agriculture on the i-th plot of land measured in
units of corn. The horizontal axis measures total capital outlay; the vertical
axis measures the marginal output as a function of capital outlay, f ′i(k). The
price of corn is p and the economy-wide rate of profit is r. Total ground
rent on the i-th plot of land is given by the area DCAG, differential rent by
DCBF and absolute rent by FBAG. DRIi is given by DJI, and DRIIi by
IJCBF .
plot is depicted in Figure 6. There is no qualitative difference between the m-
th plot and any other plot of land. Much like on any other plot, total rent on
the m-th plot is also the sum of DRI,DRII and AR. A more interesting case
is presented by the worst quality plot, i.e. the plot indexed with n = n(p).
On the worst quality plot, which is depicted in Figure 7, the graph of the
marginal product starts at f ′n(0). From (6), we see that for the n-th plot,
k∗n = 0. This implies, using the expression in (7), that DRIn = 0. By the
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concavity of the production function, we have f ′n(.) < 0. Hence DRIIn > 0.
We also know that ym > (1 + r)/p, so that ARn > 0. Thus, on the worst
quality plot, total rent is composed of DRII and AR; there is no DRI. This
is an important conclusion and worth commenting on. Marx thought that
total rent on the worst quality plot of land could be identified with absolute
rent, i.e. there would be no differential rent on the worst quality plot (Marx,
1993, Chapter 45). Our analysis shows that that is not correct. On the
worst quality plot of land, total rent is composed of both AR and DRII.
Since DRII arises from the concavity of the production function, i.e. the
diminishing marginal product of capital outlay, Marx’s conclusion seems to
derive from his ignoring this latter factor when analyzing rent on the worst
quality plot of land.
There is a deeper problem in the analysis presented so far. We have
completely ignored the decision making process of the capitalist farmers. In
more concrete terms, by assuming a given amount of capital outlay on each
plot of land, we have ignored the process and implications of the behaviour
of capitalist farmers. This is a serious shortcoming because, once we allow a
reasonable behaviour of capitalist farmers, there will be a serious implication
for the analysis of rent. To that we now turn.
4 Ground-Rent With Endogenous Capital Out-
lays
Thus far, the analysis of ground-rent has treated the amount of capital out-
lays on each plot of land as exogenously given. We would now like to en-
dogenize capital outlay by positing a simple behavioural rule. On each plot
of land, capitalist producers choose the amount of capital outlay that will
maximize the surplus profit they can earn vis-a-vis what they can earn if
they were to employ their capital elsewhere in the economy.
4.1 There is No Absolute Rent
Since the economy-wide rate of profit is exogenously given to be r, capitalist
producers can always earn the total revenue of (1 + r)ki by employing their
capital, ki, elsewhere in the economy. If they choose to employ the capital in
agricultural production on the i-th plot of land, then they can expect to earn
total revenue of pfi(ki), if the price of the agricultural commodity is p. If
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Figure 6: Ground rent in agriculture on the m-th plot (i.e. worst capital plot)
of land measured in units of corn.
total rent is a lump-sum monetary payment given by GRi, then the amount
of revenue they can expect to earn by employing their capital in agriculture
is pfi(ki)−GRi. Hence, the extra revenue a capitalist can earn by investing
her capital in agriculture is given by pfi(ki)−GRi− (1 + r)ki. We posit that
capitalist producers choose the level of capital outlay, ki, on the i-th plot to
maximize this surplus, i.e. her choice problem on the i-th plot of land can
be represented as follows:
max
ki
pfi(ki)−GRi − (1 + r)ki.
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The first order condition of this maximisation problem gives us the optimal
choice of capital outlay as k∗i , where,
f ′i(k
∗
i ) =
1 + r
p
. (9)
This condition means that on the i-th plot of land, the optimal amount of
capital outlay that will be chosen by profit-maximising capitalist farmers
will be such that the marginal product of capital outlay will be equalized to
(1 + r)/p. Since this latter magnitude is exogenously given, because r and p
are exogenously given to the capitalist farmer, this implies that the marginal
product of capital outlay on each plot of land will be equalized. This is
intuitively clear. If there were differences in the marginal product of capital
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outlay, inter-plot movement of capital would allow capitalist producers to
increase surplus profit. The equilibrium configuration of the distribution of
capital outlays will rule this out. Hence, the marginal product of capital
outlay has to be equalized across plots of land.
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Figure 8: Decomposition of ground rent in agriculture on the i-th plot of land,
measured in units of corn, when rent is specified as a lump-sum monetary
payment. In this case, there is no absolute rent. Total ground-rent is the
sum of differential rent of first variety (DRI) and differential rent of second
variety (DRII).
The condition represented in (9) has an important implication for the
decomposition of ground-rent. Turning to our previous definition of the
marginal-capital plot of land in (2), we can see that once we endogenize
capital outlays using the principle of surplus maximization, all plots become
marginal-capital plots of land. Since f ′i(ki) is equal for each plot, hence,
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ym = f ′i(ki) for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n(p)}. Using (9), we see further that
ym = f ′i(ki) = (1 + r)/p. From the expression in (5), we see that absolute
rent, ARi, is zero. In terms of Figure 4, this means that OF = OE = OG,
so that ARi = 0.
One strand of Marxist literature argues, in line with Marx’s argument in
Chapter 45 of Volume III of Capital, that the source of absolute rent is the
low organic composition of capital in agriculture relative to the rest of the
economy (Fine, 1979; Fine and Filho, 2010; Fine, 2019). The analysis in this
section raises doubts on such claims because the conclusion that ARi = 0
does not depend on the price level, p, or the uniform rate of profit, r; it is
true for any combination of p and r. If the organic composition of capital
were to rise in the rest of the economy relative to agriculture, as used in the
argument in Fine (1979), then the uniform rate of profit, r, would fall to
r′, say. Capitalist farmers would choose the level of capital outlay to ensure
that f ′i(ki) is equal to (1 + r
′)/p. Hence, absolute rent would still be zero.
The relatively lower organic composition of capital in agriculture does not
generate any absolute rent.
To emphasize the conclusions of this section, I have visually represented
the configuration of ground-rent and its decomposition, when capital outlay
is endogenous, in Figure 8. The total amount of ground-rent on plot i is
represented by the area DCE. This is, as before, the surplus profit. DRIi (p)
is represented, just like in Figure 3, by the area DIJ . This is the part of
ground-rent that can be attributed to quality differentials across plots of
land. DRIIi (p) is now represented by the area IJCE, and there is no AR.
Thus, we now have a two-part decomposition of ground-rent on the i-th plot
as
GRi (p) = DRIi (p) +DRIIi (p) ,
where
DRIi (p) =
∫ k∗i (p)
0
[
f ′i(k)− f ′n(p) (0)
]
dk, (10)
and
DRIIi (p) =
∫ ki
0
[
f ′i(k)−
1 + r
p
]
dk −DRIi (p) . (11)
4.2 Can Absolute Rent be Positive?
Let us now return to the condition that we had implicitly assumed when
analysing rent with exogenous capital outlays: f ′i(ki) > (1 + r)/p. This
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assumption was crucial for generating positive amount of absolute rent on
the i-th plot of land (see equation 5).3 The importance of this assumption
can be visually seen from Figure 4 and 5. This assumption implies that
there is a ‘gap’ between the marginal product of capital outlay, f ′i(ki), and
the opportunity cost of capital outlay, (1 + r)/p. Thus, only when there is a
gap between f ′i(ki) and (1 + r)/p, can the i-th plot generate positive AR. If
there are mechanisms available in a capitalist economy that can put a wedge
between the marginal product of capital outlay and the opportunity cost of
capital outlay, then it can generate positive absolute rent.
The two main contenders for explaining absolute rent are the relatively
low organic composition of capital and the class power of landlords. In the
previous section, we have seen that a relatively low organic composition of
capital cannot generate any wedge between the marginal product of capital
outlay and the opportunity cost of capital outlay. Hence, a relatively low
organic composition of capital cannot be the source of absolute rent. Now,
we would like to investigate the efficacy of the other explanation: class power
of landlords.
To see how the class power of landlords might generate absolute rent, let
us consider one mechanism that might generate a wedge between the marginal
product of capital outlay and the opportunity cost of capital outlay: taxation
of capital outlay. For instance, if the state were to tax capital outlays at the
rate of t > 0, then the capitalist farmers choice problem would become
max
ki
pfi(ki)−GRi − tki − (1 + r)ki,
so that the optimal choice of capital outlay would satisfy the condition that
f ′i(k
∗
i ) =
1 + r + t
p
. (12)
Since t > 0, this would ensure that f ′i(k
∗
i ) > (1 + r)/p. From (5), we can see
that the absolute rent would just be the tax revenue collected by the state:
ARi = tk
∗
i /p. If the class of landlords were strong enough to ensure that the
state redistributes the tax revenue, tk∗i /p, to them, then we could consider it
to be absolute rent. Thus, there seems to be some justification for the claim
that class power of landlords can generate absolute rent. But this is only
apparently correct.
3We had assumed that f ′i(ki) > (1 + r)/p for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. This ensured that y
m,
which is the minimum f ′i(ki) across the n plots, was also larger than (1 + r)/p.
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To see the problem with the class power argument, let k∗i,T and k
∗
i,NT de-
note the optimal capital outlays on the i-th plot of land with and without
taxation of capital outlay, respectively. The first order condition in (9) de-
termines k∗i,NT as, f
′
i(k
∗
i,NT ) = (1 + r)/p; and the first order condition in (12)
determines k∗i,T as f
′
i(k
∗
i,T ) = (1 + r + t)/p. The concavity of fi(.) and the
fact that t > 0 implies that k∗i,NT > k
∗
i,T . Thus, when there is taxation of
capital outlays, it will lead to a loss of rent for the class of landlords, which
is represented by the area JCF in Figure 9. Therefore, it seems that if the
class of landlords were strong enough to impact public policy, they would in
fact push for removing the taxation of capital outlays, rather than ensuring
the redistribution of the tax revenue towards themselves (and call it absolute
rent). And if there is no taxation of capital outlays, then absolute rent would
be zero.
In the mid-19th century, when Marx turned his attention to the prob-
lem of absolute rent, feudal obligations were still enforced in many parts of
Germany. One could perhaps think of these feudal obligations as taxes on
capital, which would then explain why Marx theorised about absolute rent.
It might also be argued that once landlords became capitalist revenue max-
imizers, they realized that the feudal dues were in fact reducing the total
ground rent by creating a wedge between the marginal rate of profit in in-
dustry and agriculture. This might have been one of the important factors
that led to the outlawing of feudal obligations.4
5 Price of Corn
So far we have taken the price of the agricultural commodity is given. To
complete the analysis, we need to investigate how this price is determined.
To do so we look at the market for corn. Let us posit a demand function for
corn, D (p; γ), where ∂D/∂p < 0 and γ captures shift factors like population
growth, urbanization, regulatory aspects of the corn market, etc. The total
supply of corn can be expressed as
S (p) =
n(p)∑
i=1
fi (ki(p)) . (13)
4I would like to thank Duncan Foley for pointing this out.
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Figure 9: A comparison of the total ground-rent on the i-th plot with and
without taxation of capital outlay.
Note that total supply of corn is an upward sloping function of price because
of two reasons. First, the actual number of plots in use for agricultural pro-
duction is a function of p, i.e. n = n(p). We had made this assumption right
at the outset, and it is now clear why this was important. The dependence
of the number of plot of land in use is a function of the price of corn be-
cause as the price of corn rises, it makes worse plots of land profitable to
bring under cultivation. Second, on any plot in use, we know that ki is an
(increasing) function of p, so that output is an (increasing) function of price,
i.e. fi (ki(p)). Hence, total supply, S (p) is an (increasing) function of p.
The equilibrium price of corn is the level of p = p∗ which bring supply and
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demand into balance, i.e.
D (p∗; γ) = S (p∗) ≡
n(p∗)∑
i=1
fi (ki(p
∗)) . (14)
To ensure that our model is properly closed, let us conduct a simple counting
argument. On the one hand, when there is no taxation of capital outlays, our
model is captured by (12) and (14). Thus, we have n+ 1 equations because
(9) gives us n equations and (14) gives us one more. The model has n + 1
endogenous variables, k1, . . . , kn, p
∗, and one exogenous variables, r. Hence,
the equation system can be solved to arrive at the equilibrium magnitudes
of all the endogenous variables. On the other hand, when the state taxes
capital outlays, our model is captured by (12) and (14). Thus, we have n+ 1
equations and n + 2 endogenous variables, k1, . . . , kn, t, p
∗. Once we choose
a value of t = t∗, the model is closed and we can solve for all the endogenous
variables.
We can now ready present the condition under which any plot of land will
be in use in a capitalist economy with landed property, i.e. private ownership
of land by the class of landlords. In such a context, any plot of land will be
in use it can be leased in profitably by a capitalist farmer. And it can be
leased in only when it pays a positive amount of ground-rent to the landlord
in addition to ensuring the uniform rate of profit for capital investment. Let
us consider the most extreme case when the demand for corn is so low that
even the ‘best’ plot of land cannot be profitably used. In this situation, there
will be no corn production and hence there will be zero ground-rent. This
immediately identifies the minimum threshold for the price, if rent is to be
positive, as
p∗∗ =
1 + r
f ′1(0)
, (15)
where, it is to be recalled from Assumption 2 that plot 1 is the best quality
plot. If population growth, urbanization, etc. leads to growth of demand for
the agricultural product such that p > p∗∗, this will bring land under culti-
vation. As soon as any land is brought under cultivation, this will generate
positive ground-rent. As demand rises further, progressively more (worse
plots) land will come under cultivation and total rent will increase. Techni-
cal change will have a more ambiguous effect.
In our model, technical change can be captured by the upward shifts of
the marginal product curves. Such upward shifts of the marginal product
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curves would imply that the same plots of land can satisfy rising demand.
Hence, more, and worse quality, parcels will not need to be brought under
cultivation as the demand for the agricultural commodity rises. This would
reduce the total amount of ground-rent that would otherwise have to be
paid by capitalist farmers. On the other hand, upward shifts of the marginal
product curves also imply larger surplus profit on all the existing plots in use.
Hence, this would have a tendency to raise the total amount of ground-rent.
Therefore, the overall impact of technical change on the total ground-rent
earned by the class of landlords will depend on the relative strengths of these
opposing effects.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have offered a rigorous way to conceptualize Marx’s ideas
about ground-rent. In developing the analysis of this paper, I have extended
the discussion in two recent, noteworthy attempts to clarify Marx’s theory
of ground-rent, Basu (2018) and Das (2018). Previous attempts to discuss
Marx’s theory of ground-rent has been marked by disagreements and confu-
sions partly because of the difficulty in clearly defining the meaning of the
terms involved in the discussion, especially the components of ground-rent
(Fine, 1979; Ramirez, 2009; Fine and Filho, 2010). In this respect, Basu
(2018) and Das (2018) advanced the literature by trying to clearly specify
Marx’s ideas, avoid unnecessary exegetical debate, and formalize the ideas
in simple mathematical models.
In this paper, I have extended the analysis further by endogenising the
capital outlay on each plot of land using a simple and intuitive profit-maximising
principle to model the behaviour of capitalist farmers. This simple extension
has far reaching conclusions. Our analysis shows that total ground-rent can
be decomposed into differential rent of the first variety, differential rent of
the second variety and absolute rent only when capital outlays are taken to
be exogenously given. As soon as we endogenize capital outlays using the
principle of profit maximisation, the decomposition of ground-rent changes.
While we always have differential rent of the first and second varieties, the ex-
istence of absolute rent now hinges on their being a gap between the marginal
product of capital outlay and the opportunity cost of investing capital out-
side agriculture. In general, profit maximization by capitalist farmers will
ensure that this is not true, i.e. they will choose to invest capital precisely
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in the magnitude that equates the marginal product of capital outlay and
the opportunity cost of investing capital outside agriculture. Thus, absolute
will be zero. I have argued in this paper that neither a relatively low organic
composition of capital in agriculture nor the class power of landlords can, in
general, ensure positive absolute rent.
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